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Beat Hangartner
3f397f5f78
The pinning comment stated that a tag is mutable but not what an attacker
does with that, so the trade-off was hard to judge for anyone reviewing or
later undoing the pins. Spell out the mechanism: a tag is a name pointing
at a commit, anyone with push access upstream can force-push it elsewhere,
and FetchContent resolves it at build time, so a stolen maintainer account
or CI token makes every fresh build compile the attacker's code while
nothing changes here and the tag name still reads correctly. A commit hash
is derived from the content and cannot be moved that way.
Name the two cases where this was actually exploited: tj-actions/changed-
files in March 2025 (CVE-2025-30066), where tags v1 through v45.0.7 were
retargeted to a commit leaking CI secrets into build logs across more than
23,000 repositories, and aquasecurity/trivy-action in March 2026
(CVE-2026-33634), where 76 of 77 version tags were force-pushed to a
credential stealer for about twelve hours. Both were GitHub Actions rather
than CMake dependencies, which the comment says, because the point is the
shared mechanism of resolving a tag at build time.
Also document how to upgrade a pin, including that git ls-remote reports
the tag object for an annotated tag and the commit on the "^{}" line.
The note lives in fetch_pugixml.cmake, which fetch_kdeaddons.cmake and
fetch_singleapplication.cmake already refer to. Comments only; no build
behaviour changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
60 lines
2.7 KiB
CMake
60 lines
2.7 KiB
CMake
# Copyright 2006 The QElectroTech Team
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# This file is part of QElectroTech.
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#
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# QElectroTech is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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# the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of the License, or
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# (at your option) any later version.
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#
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# QElectroTech is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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# GNU General Public License for more details.
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#
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# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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# along with QElectroTech. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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message(" - fetch_pugixml")
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Include(FetchContent)
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option(BUILD_PUGIXML "Build pugixml library, use system one otherwise" YES)
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if(BUILD_PUGIXML)
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# Pinned to the commit v1.15 points at, not to the tag itself.
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#
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# A git tag is only a named pointer to a commit, and anyone with push access
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# to the upstream repository can move it (git push --force) to any other
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# commit. FetchContent fetches whatever the tag points at when the build
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# runs, so if a maintainer account or CI token is compromised, the attacker
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# can retarget a well-known release tag to malicious code: every fresh build
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# of QElectroTech then compiles it, while nothing changes in this repository
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# and the tag name still looks correct. A commit hash cannot be moved, because
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# it is derived from the content: different code always has a different hash.
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#
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# This attack has been used in the wild:
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# - March 2025, tj-actions/changed-files (CVE-2025-30066): tags v1 through
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# v45.0.7 were retargeted to a commit that dumped CI secrets into build
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# logs, affecting more than 23,000 repositories.
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# - March 2026, aquasecurity/trivy-action (CVE-2026-33634): 76 of 77
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# version tags were force-pushed to a credential stealer and stayed
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# malicious for about 12 hours.
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# Both were GitHub Actions rather than CMake dependencies, but the mechanism
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# is the same one FetchContent relies on here: resolving a git tag at build
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# time.
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#
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# To upgrade, look up the new tag's commit with git ls-remote <repo> <tag>
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# (for an annotated tag, take the hash on the "<tag>^{}" line, which is the
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# commit; the other line is the tag object), check that it is the release you
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# expect, and update both the hash and the trailing tag comment.
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FetchContent_Declare(
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pugixml
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GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/zeux/pugixml.git
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GIT_TAG ee86beb30e4973f5feffe3ce63bfa4fbadf72f38) # v1.15
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set(PUGIXML_INSTALL OFF CACHE INTERNAL "")
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FetchContent_MakeAvailable(pugixml)
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else()
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find_package(pugixml REQUIRED)
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endif()
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