mirror of
https://github.com/qelectrotech/qelectrotech-source-mirror.git
synced 2026-09-22 09:14:14 +02:00
Beat Hangartner
75 lines
3.6 KiB
CMake
75 lines
3.6 KiB
CMake
# Copyright 2006 The QElectroTech Team
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# This file is part of QElectroTech.
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#
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# QElectroTech is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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# it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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# the Free Software Foundation, either version 2 of the License, or
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# (at your option) any later version.
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#
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# QElectroTech is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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# GNU General Public License for more details.
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#
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# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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# along with QElectroTech. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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message(" - fetch_pugixml")
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Include(FetchContent)
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option(BUILD_PUGIXML "Build pugixml library, use system one otherwise" YES)
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if(BUILD_PUGIXML)
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# Pinned to the commit v1.15 points at, not to the tag itself.
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#
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# A git tag is only a named pointer to a commit, and anyone with push access
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# to the upstream repository can move it (git push --force) to any other
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# commit. FetchContent fetches whatever the tag points at when the build
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# runs, so if a maintainer account or CI token is compromised, the attacker
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# can retarget a well-known release tag to malicious code: every fresh build
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# of QElectroTech then compiles it, while nothing changes in this repository
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# and the tag name still looks correct. A commit hash cannot be moved, because
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# it is derived from the content: different code always has a different hash.
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#
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# This attack has been used in the wild:
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# - March 2025, tj-actions/changed-files (CVE-2025-30066): tags v1 through
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# v45.0.7 were retargeted to a commit that dumped CI secrets into build
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# logs, affecting more than 23,000 repositories.
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# - March 2026, aquasecurity/trivy-action (CVE-2026-33634): 76 of 77
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# version tags were force-pushed to a credential stealer and stayed
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# malicious for about 12 hours.
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# Both were GitHub Actions rather than CMake dependencies, but the mechanism
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# is the same one FetchContent relies on here: resolving a git tag at build
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# time.
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#
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# To upgrade, look up the commit the new tag points at with
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# git ls-remote <repo> 'refs/tags/<tag>*', check that it is the release you
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# expect, and update both the hash and the trailing tag comment.
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#
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# How many lines that prints depends on which of the two kinds of tag
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# upstream created:
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# - A lightweight tag is nothing but a ref pointing straight at the commit,
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# so ls-remote prints a single line, "refs/tags/<tag>", and its hash is
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# the commit to pin. pugixml tags this way, which is why the v1.15 hash
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# below is what "git ls-remote ... refs/tags/v1.15" reports directly;
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# SingleApplication (v3.2.0) does the same.
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# - An annotated tag is a git object in its own right, carrying a tagger,
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# a date, a message and optionally a GPG signature, and pointing at the
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# commit. ls-remote then prints two lines: "refs/tags/<tag>" is the tag
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# object and "refs/tags/<tag>^{}" is that object dereferenced, i.e. the
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# commit. The KDE Frameworks modules tag this way, so for them it is the
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# "^{}" hash that belongs in the pin; the other hash identifies the tag
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# object itself, which is not the source revision and changes whenever
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# upstream re-creates the tag, even over the very same commit.
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FetchContent_Declare(
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pugixml
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GIT_REPOSITORY https://github.com/zeux/pugixml.git
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GIT_TAG ee86beb30e4973f5feffe3ce63bfa4fbadf72f38) # v1.15
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set(PUGIXML_INSTALL OFF CACHE INTERNAL "")
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FetchContent_MakeAvailable(pugixml)
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else()
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find_package(pugixml REQUIRED)
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endif()
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